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Paradoxes and Puzzles: Appreciating Gardens and Urban Nature
  Stephanie Ross 
Abstract
To explore our appreciation of gardens and urban nature, I propose a
recursive definition of original or wild nature together with guidelines for
discerning degrees of naturalness. Arguing (contra Robert Elliott) that
nature can be restored as well as degraded, I characterize four varieties of
urban nature - interrupted, altered, constructed, and virtual. I build on Stan
Godlovitch's comments about scale to suggest two modes of appreciation -
macroscopic and fine-focused. I close by discussing some particular
examples - parks, environmental art, gardens - and drawing some
conclusions for the appreciation of vernacular gardens.[1]
Key Words
appreciation, nature, degrees of naturalness, urban nature (interrupted,
altered, constructed, virtual), vernacular gardens
1. Introduction
Our transactions with both gardens and urban nature pose puzzles. In each
case questions arise about our activity and its object.[2] Addressing these
questions draws on work from several areas - garden aesthetics, the
aesthetics of nature, the nature of appreciation. In what follows, I will
approach these issues from the perspective of nature appreciation. After
presenting some background to frame the discussion, I will focus on
questions of definition and try to characterize the proper object of nature
appreciation. Next I will turn to the paradoxical category of urban nature
and offer a tentative taxonomy. Finally, I will turn to some specific cases
and consider what appreciation ought to encompass. I will conclude with
some consequences for the appreciation of vernacular gardens.
Let me make one preliminary remark about the notion of appreciation that
will be in place here. I am using appreciation as the generic or default term
to capture our desired interactions with works of art and our aesthetic
responses to nature. I am inspired here by the multi-pronged analogy Ted
Cohen set up in his rich and amusing paper "Jokes." To investigate the
relation of a joke to its proper effect, as well as why we occupy ourselves
with jokes, Cohen compared and contrasted jokes, arguments, and works of
art.[3] Successful jokes compel laughter, successful arguments compel
belief. In a footnote (p. 121), Cohen suggests that the corresponding effect
for works of art is hard to specify. He canvases a few possibilities --
understanding a work, liking it, knowing that it is good - seeking the proper
analog to feeling a joke's funniness. But then his closing remark,
characterizing "what is appreciation?" as "an absolutely basic question in
the philosophy of art" also, in my opinion, provides the answer. Appreciation
is the proper effect that parallels, in the case of art, the relation of laughter
to jokes and of persuasion to arguments. It is particularly useful that the
term 'appreciation' can embrace a variety of responses - sensory, cognitive,
emotional, imaginative and more. Thus adopting this term does not close off
particular avenues of analysis or pre-determine the shape of my account.
2. Setting the Stage - Philosophical Work to Date
The recent interest in nature appreciation was triggered by Ronald
Hepburn's 1966 article "Contemporary Aesthetics and the Neglect of Natural
Beauty." Hepburn took philosophers to task for neglecting the natural world.
In addition, he set out two distinctive aspects of nature appreciation. First of
all, the spectator, rather than being static and disengaged, is often
surrounded by, immersed in, nature. "We are in nature and a part of
nature."[4] And second, nature comes unbounded and unframed, which
"precludes full determinateness and stability in the natural aesthetic
object."[5] Both these traits - our being immersed, and nature being
unframed -- make nature appreciation decidedly different from art
appreciation.
Allen Carlson, in a series of papers beginning in the 1970's, has attempted
to clarify the differences between nature appreciation and art appreciation.
The crux of his view is the paradoxical claim that the aesthetic appreciation
of nature must be science-based. In the paper "Appreciation and the
Natural Environment," Carlson argues that we seriously misconstrue the
natural world if we view selected segments of it as we would view sculpture
or view selected scenes as we would view paintings.[6] Neither model
acknowledges the essential traits we ascribe to nature, the unboundedness
and lack of framing that Hepburn pointed out. We must bring to bear
appropriate theory to facilitate our appreciation of nature. And so Carlson
proposes that science (along with supporting chunks of common sense) play
the roles with regard to nature appreciation that art theory and art history
play in the appreciation of art.
Carlson's theory has been much discussed, and I won't rehearse all the
criticisms that have accumulated. They cluster into two groups: those that
attack the scientific knowledge Carlson champions, and those that
concentrate instead on other appreciative modes he has overlooked or
discounted. Critics in the first camp complain variously that scientific
knowledge is not necessary for the aesthetic appreciation of nature, that
such knowledge is not available or is ever-changing; that science, in
tracking generalities and positing natural kinds, overlooks uniqueness, and
that science inappropriately demystifies nature.[7] Those in the second
camp promote alternative modes of appreciation, including imagination,
emotion, instinct, association, non-scientific narratives, and non-discursive
acquaintance.[8] These last writers differ on whether the appreciative
modes they promote should supplant or merely supplement Carlson's
science-based approach.
My interest in Carlson's theory is two-fold. I am eager to find an adequate
definition of nature, so that we can know just when the debates he has
triggered are invoked. I also want to identify those cases where his
approach seems especially appropriate and helpful.
3. Defining Nature
Before turning to the aesthetics of nature, we must settle the prior
ontological question, "What is nature?" - or more practically, "Where is
nature?" (The challenge is intensified when we consider the paradoxical
notion of urban nature.) Extreme answers are tempting when we seek a
definition. On the one hand, it can seem that there's no nature left:
everything has been affected by human culture, no part of the earth has
escaped our influence. On the other hand, it can seem that everything is
nature: since we're natural, then so too are our activities and their
products. Clearly the first point of view equates nature with wildness.
Paradigm cases of nature would include virgin forest, vast deserts or
badlands, the open sea. Yet if we seek such realms utterly unaffected by
human activity, we are bound to fail. Effluents in the air, acid rain,
agricultural run-off, global warming have all caused even the most remote
and expansive natural landscapes to bear some evidence of human activity.
And so nature is extinct.
This first understanding of nature, at once wistful and pessimistic, is
criticized by William Cronon in his essay "The Trouble with Wilderness." He
decries accounts whereby "The place where we are is the place where
nature is not," noting that such dualistic construals deny us the middle
ground where we make our home.[9] Cronon's solution to this definitional
dilemma is to deem nature a cultural construct. This is all very well, but
what construction is called for? What concept of nature should we put in
place?
It doesn't seem useful to adopt the alternative view, one declaring
everything natural and nature still abundant. This rings false in all sorts of
cases. When we view the tragic scenes of Hurricane Katrina's destruction in
August 2005, it seems reasonable to deem the storm itself and the rain that
fell as natural, but not the New Orleans landmarks - Superdome,
skyscrapers, elevated highways - sitting in the floodwaters, nor the oil
drilling platforms that washed ashore. If anything, commentators want to
question even the naturalness of Katrina, arguing that human-induced
global warming has intensified the germination of hurricanes and tropical
storms. Our concept of nature, appropriately constructed, should flag our
sense that nature and culture are oppositional, and that we are unlikely to
find pure examples of either. Let us grant, then, that nature and culture
interpenetrate and that naturalness comes in degrees. We can and do make
judgments about the degree of naturalness of particular cases. A human
walking across a pristine beach and leaving footprints is quite a different
matter from a developer constructing condos all along that same beach.
4. Restoration
Before I indicate my approach to a definition, one more issue must be
addressed, the problem of restoration. If nature and naturalness come in
degrees, then it should be possible to enhance as well as degrade the
naturalness of a given site. Yet some argue that nature can never be
restored. In the paper (and later eponymous book) "Faking Nature," Robert
Elliott assimilates nature restoration to forgery in art. Elliott's specific claim
is that restoring natural areas cannot bring back the value that was
previously there.[10] Elliott traces value to origins in both the case of
nature and the case of art. He claims that natural objects possess "a special
kind of continuity with the past" (p. 159) and suggests that "What is
significant about wilderness is its causal continuity with the past" (p. 160,
my emphasis). This continuity is breeched when, say, mountains are re-
formed after strip-mining, forests re-planted after clear-cutting, wetlands
relocated after development. And so Elliott's complaint is not merely that
restored nature is less valuable than original nature, but rather, that it is no
longer nature at all because it is no longer tied to its past.
To further his argument, Elliott describes two more radical sorts of faked
nature. The first is a Nozickian experience machine, which generates in
properly plugged-in experimental subjects a compelling illusion of hiking
through wilderness. The second is an artfully simulated plastic wilderness
through which subjects actually walk; it too generates a compelling illusion.
Clearly these are virtual natures. They deliver experiences indistinguishable
from being in actual nature, while containing no natural material. Elliott
takes the restored mining site he first discussed to be no less duplicitous.
His trio of examples is meant to establish that neither being indiscernible
from nature nor having entirely natural contents suffices for being nature.
Required instead is continuity of process, where current contents result
from, or are preserved by, uninterrupted processes of a certain sort. When
a strip-mining site is reshaped and replanted, the right sort of contents
reappear, but the causal continuity has been cut. A similar (though more
longstanding!) gap applies to Alan Sonfist's environmental installation "Time
Landscape,"a city block in downtown Manhattan planted to create precisely
the sort of forest that would have greeted explorers in Colonial times.
5. Original Nature: A Recursive Definition
We are now in a position to offer guidelines for discerning degrees of
nature. To establish a baseline, we can construct a recursive definition of
original or wild nature. At one time everything was nature. Pick any moment
from the Paleozoic era. (Any pre-human point will do.) We can then non-
circularly identify nature-preserving processes as those studied by the
various sciences - physics, astronomy, meteorology, geology, biology, and
so on. So, our initial moment is entirely natural, and any state that results
from the specified processes acting on the initial moment is also natural, as
is any state that results from those processes acting on subsequent natural
states. Such an approach yields a holistic nature, one rife with cataclysm,
destruction, extinction. Yet not one where the degree of naturalness
changes. The unfolding processes specified don't increase the naturalness of
the world. Nor do the large-scale disastrous events - meteor hits, climate
change, tectonic shifts - decrease it. So long as the processes flagged in the
recursive definition of original nature continue, that nature exists.
Wild nature, Sierra view/Photo: John Martin
6. Human Intervention and Degrees of Naturalness
The world described so far is not the world we live in. The notion of degrees
of naturalness, which seems to characterize our world, does not take hold
until we introduce something oppositional -- processes that thwart or
undermine those that constitute original nature. Those processes arrive with
us.
How should the advent of humankind be treated? If this is introduced as a
set of events unfolding within the purview of evolutionary science, we have
captured the "everything is nature" view. This probably is the proper way to
treat the activities of our early humanoid precursors. But at some point our
ancestors acquired the ability to change the naturalness of their
environment. Some commentators take the development of agriculture to
be the watershed moment, monoculture representing a stark change
imposed on what might otherwise have occurred in the plots cultivated. Key
here is the etiology of the changes imposed on the natural world -- they
come from us -- as well as the implicit counterfactual claim -- this wouldn't
have happened otherwise. That is, without input from us, the processes that
constitute original nature would not have brought about this effect - be it
acres of maize all planted in rows, a stream backing up behind an immense
dam, atoms splitting to release vast stores of energy. (A more fully
developed version of this proposal would recast the counterfactual claim in
statistical terms. It is not logically impossible that processes of original
nature would cause rows of maize to supplant a forest, a deep lake to
replace a stream, and so on, it is just extraordinarily unlikely. Recall the old
riddle of a pocket watch found on a deserted mountaintop.)
Holmes Rolston attempts to distinguish nature and culture along lines
compatible with this idea. He flags the differing processes used to transmit
information - genes in the case of nature, education/neural alterations in the
case of humans.[11] The goal is to erect some divide between (1)
instinctual and (2) intentional and/or learned behavior, with natural
outcomes lying on the instinctual side. Learned or intentional behaviors that
alter the underlying processes indicated in the first part of our definition
above or supplant their products with human artifacts are occasions where
an individual, a place, a species, a region, or an ecosystem may become
less natural.
7. Refining the Definition
I am not in pursuit of an essential definition of nature. The notion of relative
naturalness functions as a cluster concept, at best. The sketch produced so
far needs refining in several respects. Let me touch on four points. First, it
won't do to simply equate the natural with the unintended. The disastrous
consequences of the nuclear accident at Chernobyl, for example, were
surely never intended, but they shouldn't be deemed natural. Rather, we
should stipulate that any causal chain initiated by human intentional activity
has the potential to increase or decrease the degree of nature at a given
site. (The effects might also be more widely dispersed.) Once human
activities have altered the degree of nature in a given respect, subsequent
calibrations of comparative naturalness should refer to this new baseline.
Second, contra Elliott, we should allow that past environmental damage can
be undone. Human activity can increase naturalness. Restoration occurs
when the intention to champion non-human nature results in our re-
introducing natural contents and protecting or re-instituting constitutive
processes.
This presupposes a third point. Judgments of degree of naturalness seem to
make reference to contents as well as to process. Recall Elliott's strip-
mining example. It involved restoration with the plant and animal species
that had earlier been in place. It was certainly more natural than the virtual
alternatives - for instance, the plastic world that looked convincingly
natural, but was entirely ersatz. There are also occasions where humans
alter a landscape by introducing new ingredient types that, though natural,
were not previously in place. Consider non-native species, tree-snakes in
Hawaii, cane toads in Australia, purple loosestrife throughout the US. Their
introduction seems natural compared to the addition of non-living artifacts
into the landscape, nevertheless, it still serves to reduce the overall level of
naturalness of the site. I believe claims of this sort that purportedly refer to
contents could, in principle, be cashed out in terms of underlying processes.
The resulting judgments would again track counterfactual intuitions,
estimating the likelihood that, absent human intervention, processes already
in place would bring about these changes. Arcane scientific knowledge would
have to be recruited in formulating such arguments. So in practice, we
probably base our actual judgments on some informal sense of the
foreignness of content.
Can we hope for any sort of agreement in judging degrees of naturalness?
Compare and contrast strip-mining, intensive agriculture, golf courses in the
desert, suburban lawns. There is no threshold we can specify for
determining when nature can be said to have been altered, no counting of
contents that answers the question. To adopt an example from Robert
Nozick, emptying my 6-ounce can of tomato juice into the ocean neither
makes it mine nor makes it non-natural. Nor is there some fixed size after
which an oil spill has that effect, though we'd certainly agree that the oil
spill is more harmful than poured juice. It may be that we could increase
agreement by concentrating only on pair-wise comparisons. Oil spill vs.
tomato juice is a no-brainer. I wager agriculture would trump suburban
lawns, strip mining trump the desert golf-course, in pair-wise judgments of
non-naturalness. But other pairs might simply seem incommensurable
(Versailles vs. an equivalently sized segment of Scotland's St. Andrews golf
course?), nor should we expect sets of these judgments to behave
transitively.
Finally, Hepburn's earlier point about the framelessness of nature
complicates this discussion; it affects not only our aesthetic judgments but
also our judgments of comparative naturalness. How should we focus our
attention when debating the naturalness of a particular individual, area,
event, and so on? How do we determine what portions of nature are
affected when processes are altered, contents removed or introduced? It
doesn't seem right to parse all actions in or directed towards nature
holistically. So we need some way to focus our attention when considering
naturalness. Perhaps each claim or debate could be indexed -- to an
individual, to an event, to a process, to a delimited geographical area, to a
specified ecosystem or subsystem, and so on. Here, once again, we would
need information from various sciences in order to lay out such an indexing
process.
The sketch I have just offered for assessing degrees of naturalness is not
complete and perhaps not even completeable. But I believe it captures the
spirit of our pre-theoretical judgments. So let me turn now to some
applications.
8. Urban Nature and Considerations of Scale
The notion of urban nature is nothing if not oxymoronic. Since nature is
often associated with wildness, nature and culture -- and even more so,
nature and things urban -- seem antithetical. Where or how, then, might
nature be a part of the urban landscape? To answer this question, we need
to add one more element to our analysis. Stan Godlovitch, in a paper
entitled "Icebreakers," tried to work out an acentric account that
characterized nature as aloof, mysterious, and, above all, utterly indifferent
to human activities, interests, and needs.[12] He was inspired, in part, by
Thomas Nagel's account of objectivity in the book The View from Nowhere.
The important result, for our purposes, was the way Godlovitch calls our
attention to questions of scale. In his characterization of an indifferent,
acentric nature, he emphasizes natural processes and events that aren't
perceptible by humans - those that generate effects outside the range of our
senses, or that unfold in systems of time (biological, geological) of which we
remain unaware.
Alexander Baumgarten introduced the term "aesthetic" in the 18th century
to indicate a variety of sensuous knowledge. It follows that aesthetic
appreciation can only occur within the range of our receptive capacities.
Certainly, this must apply to our aesthetic appreciation of nature. And so we
cannot aesthetically appreciate the imperceptible aspects of nature
discussed by Godlovitch. His account does, however, suggest appreciative
options that have to do with scale. We often have a choice between two
sorts of focus, the macroscopic and the microscopic. That is, we are able to
direct our attention and perceptually zoom in or out, noticing vast items --
panoramas, weather systems, astronomical relations and events -- or
minute ones -- a tiny insect, a single blossom, a drop of dew. I believe that
urban nature is particularly susceptible to appreciation at these perceptual
extremes, it also sustains a third case I will lay out shortly.
The account sketched above of degrees of nature suggests that urban
nature would be relatively diffuse, beleagured, rare. The density definitive of
urban development precludes large expanses of land supporting the plant
and animal communities that would otherwise have thrived there. Of
course, many cities develop as a result of natural features that facilitate
basic human activities and needs -- rivers, estuaries, mountains, plateaus,
wetlands, plains, . . . -- and these founding features are not displaced. But
within cities, there would not be large tracts of land resembling original
nature. I would like to propose three distinct ways in which we're able to
appreciate these 'remnants' that constitute urban nature. They can be
characterized in light of the discussion above. First of all, even within the
most densely developed cities, nature provides certain framing effects for
our experience. I'm thinking of the events and effects visible in the sky and
on the horizon - constellations and the phases of the moon, weather fronts
that move through and bring a panoply of changing looks and feels,
surrounding geographical and geological features that provide the constant
backdrop to our urban experiences. These would call for the wide-angle lens
of macroscopic appreciation.
Second, there are aspects of urban nature that call for microscopic
appreciation, though this term is a bit misleading, and so I will in the future
refer to this as fine-focused appreciation. I am thinking of bits of nature left
behind in or thrusting up through the urban infrastructure, traces of the
ecosystems that development supplanted. Examples here would include
living things - plants sprouting up through the sidewalk, trees still present in
the urban scape, animals like squirrels and pigeons thriving in proximity to
human habitation, not to mention rats and cockroaches! The edges of our
suburbs provide encounters with even larger emissaries of the natural world
- mountain lions, bears, and coyotes all make their presence felt in parts of
California. Such fine-focused appreciation can extend to inanimate objects
as well - rocks and pebbles, seasonal streams, a distinctive slope, textures
underfoot.
9. Fine-Focused Appreciation
Let me elaborate briefly on fine-focused appreciation of urban nature. The
objects of such appreciation will often be singularities, items considered on
their own rather than in any larger natural context. Allen Carlson argues
against such appreciation in rejecting the object model, claiming that it
wrongly takes natural items out of the environmental contexts that sustain
them and give them meaning. And in fact, I have claimed elsewhere that
Carlson's theory would handle what I'm calling fine-focused appreciation
less effectively than it would handle macroscopic appreciation, because the
issue of originating forces comes into play much more in the latter. By
contrast, Malcolm Budd has argued that, with nature and culture
everywhere mixed, we must perform acts of abstraction in order to
appreciate nature as nature. This would seem especially true of fine-focused
appreciation. Budd cites examples of an animal in a zoo and water in a
fountain. His thought is that our acts of appreciation focus only on those
traits of the object that would be present in a natural setting. So we key in
to the zebra but not its cage, to the water but not the fountain from which
it is propelled.[13] Note that it might take considerable background
knowledge to perform this task well. One would need to marshal the sorts
of scientific and common-sense knowledge that Carlson makes requisite for
the aesthetic appreciation of nature in order to even determine which traits
of an object warrant aesthetic attention.[14]
I haven't yet mentioned one other variety of nature appreciation that might
seem apt in an urban setting. We often admire flowers in a pot, an entire
garden, or even a more expansive park. Each of these would count as an
example of nature re-inserted into the urban landscape by intentional
human activity.
Wild flowers in urban landscape/Photo: Stephanie Ross
While some, but not all, gardens count as works of art (see below), I think
the other cases deserve some scrutiny. In fact, I would like to co-opt some
of Elliot's examples in order to characterize these additional opportunities
for appreciating urban nature. Recall that I reject one of Elliott's premises
and allow that nature can on occasion be restored. Moreover, since I allow
nature to come in degrees (to have varying degrees of naturalness),
restorations could be more or less successful. Some would increase the
degree of nature present at a given site. But what I would like to build on
here are the cases that Elliott offers up rhetorically for our ridicule: those
where an appreciator is deceived by virtual nature and plastic nature as well
as by a more straightforward restoration. Rather than endorse Elliott's
strong requirement of uninterrupted causal chains leading us back to
origins, I propose we recognize a continuum of cases - interrupted nature,
altered nature, constructed nature, virtual nature. I claim that some of
these constitute important sources of aesthetic value in urban settings.
10. Interrupted, Altered, Constructed, and Virtual Natures
My labels "interrupted," "altered," "constructed" and "virtual" are meant to
indicate an increasingly more intrusive or artificial set of ways in which
nature can be captured and presented for our aesthetic approval. The first
would comprise examples where causal chains are severed and similar
chains renewed; the second would occur where at least some different
processes and contents were put in place; the third would cover cases
where illusory experiences of nature were constructed using natural
materials, the fourth would cover those cases like the plastic world and the
experience machine where natural contents were not replaced but rather
simulated. I suggest that many of our rewarding interactions with urban
nature come from the first three types of cases. Let me describe some
examples.
Consider waterways. Rivers with cities along their banks are relatively
distant from their original natural state. Effluents are discharged into the
water, the riverbanks are often realigned or even put into concrete
channels, while on navigable rivers systems of locks and dams control water
flow. The Charles River in Massachusetts runs through bucolic suburbs
before emptying into the Atlantic Ocean in Boston Harbor. During my stint in
graduate school, a longstanding water-quality project was in place with the
avowed goal of making the Charles River once again swimmable.
Appreciation would certainly have been enhanced could one not only walk
along but also dive into the river![15] I take the Charles River project to be
one that sought to return the river to a previous more natural state. Should
the project succeed overall, I would see the naturalness of the river as
interrupted, then resumed.
Many other water-related battles are being fought in the United States.
Environmental groups are suing the Army Corps of Engineers in an attempt
to remove systems of dams that interfere with the spawning of salmon in
the West, as well as systems of locks and dams that interfere with the
natural cycles of flooding along the Missouri and Mississippi rivers.
Champions of the Florida Everglades are seeking to protect that ecosystem
from damaging agricultural runoff from nearby sugar-beet fields and protect
it as well as from increasing salinization. Each of these cases involves an
attempt to restore an area or entity to a previous, more natural state. By
contrast, some environmental projects seek instead to build entirely new
natures. For example, as the general public becomes more aware of the
beneficial effects of wetlands, environmental policies are being put in place
requiring that developers who destroy wetlands build replacement wetlands
elsewhere. Achieving the ultimate goal, 'no net loss of wetlands,' could
involve considerable construction of 'new nature!'[16]
We can of course imagine bad faith attempts to comply with the
requirement. Were new wetlands constructed miles and miles from the river
(so as to free up desirable building sites on the water), then they would not
serve their intended ecological purpose. The newly built distant wetlands
would count as constructed nature (a verdict reinforced by our
counterfactual thought experiment, looking back in time and asking the
question "what would have been here otherwise?")
A recent restoration project in my home town of St. Louis straddles the first
two sorts of interventions I'm discussing. Forest Park was established on
1370 acres west of the city in 1876.[17] It initially conformed to
conventional notions of wildness with curvilinear roads leading through
wooded groves. A vast building project ensued when the park was chosen
as the site of the 1904 World's Fair. The trees were levelled and a stream
that ran through the park - the River Des Peres - was channeled and sent
underground so as not to interfere with the World's Fair pavilions being
constructed.
Constructed Wetland: Forest Park, St. Louis/Photo: Stephanie Ross
As the centennial of the 1904 World's Fair approached, a good deal of
money was invested to restore the park. At present, Forest Park is far from
wild. It contains museums and cultural institutions and many areas devoted
to sport - golf courses, tennis courts, baseball fields, soccer fields, an
archery range. Yet the recent park improvements involved the deliberate
naturalizing of certain sections. Significantly, the River Des Peres was
brought back above ground. Both wetlands and prairie areas were put in
place. So segments of the park are more natural than they have been in
100 years. These areas are definitely urban nature. Skyscrapers and
construction cranes are visible in the near distance. And I doubt prairies and
wetlands ever abutted quite so intimately on this piece of land. The restored
segments have been miniaturized and compressed. Nevertheless, visitors
who stroll through this area of the park are treated to a convincing and
delightful sense of being immersed in nature. Flowers abound in the prairie
areas, and wading birds patrol the pools and stream. At night, a pair of
great horned owls can habitually be found in the bare treetops overlooking a
swamp. In this area, nature has been restored, reconstructed, and
enhanced. An illusion of wildness results but not one marred by deception.
Constructed Prairie: Forest Park, St. Louis/Photo: Stephanie Ross
My third category of constructed nature was meant to embrace examples
that serve human interests rather than ecosystem needs. That is, I'm
thinking of creations that meet our aesthetic, amenity and recreational
needs by building a new chunk of nature. Here's an example. An early
commission of landscape architect George Hargreaves was Byxbee Park in
Palo Alto, California.[18] The 35 acre site, on a peninsula surrounded on
two sides by water, was a reclaimed landfill (i.e., a garbage mound).
Consider the following passages describing the experience of walking
through Byxbee Park:
A walk there is similar to hikes in the English Lake District,
where the natural hills form an immediate horizon that
dissolves when one approaches the next rise. This perceived
increase in space and distance through valleys and elevations
is something that Olmsted understood when he created the
illusion of deep perspective with undulating paths .... There are
no trees, though, in the thirty-five acres of Byxbee Park, for
fear that the roots would disturb the one-foot-thick
impenetrable clay cap sealing the landfill under two feet of soil.
(p. 78)
The park mixes various natural and artificial features. The commentator
mentions that the "clusters of hillocks (reminders of Ohlone Indian shell
heaps) planted with lupines and other wildflowers offer both shelter from
the wind and a lookout over the long vistas." (p. 78) "The thick hedgerows
lining the banks of Mayfield Slough are interspersed with triangular, cedar-
plank viewing platforms for bird-watching over the wetlands." At one point,
"On the descending slope, five berms of compacted soil and rock infill, set in
ever larger arcs for erosion control, give the impression of rippling water,"
(p. 78), while "As the walk continues around the point, a conceptual forest
comes into view, a dramatic grid of weathered green cedar posts. These
create an exciting visual rhythm as the grid shifts and finally disperses into
randomness..." (p. 78).
I am struck by the way this site combines natural and artificial means to
provide an experience like that of actual nature. There are birds to watch,
flowers to identify, vistas to admire. A wave-like series of hills mimics the
experience of hiking in the Lake District, while interlocking berms and
gridded posts function as conceptual waves and forest. All of this on a
reclaimed garbage heap. Compare and contrast two examples from the
artworld. Alan Sonfist's "Time Landscape," mentioned above, reconstructs a
colonial-era forest on a block of downtown Manhattan, thus qualifying as
what I deem interrupted nature. It is at the same time a didactic piece of
environmental art. Recently, a design by the late environmental artist
Robert Smithson has been realized for a floating island to be constructed on
a barge and towed around Manhattan by a tug.
Smithson specified many of the trees to be put alongside the barge's
boulders. Some but not all are native species. Since we have no reason to
think there ever was an actual island, now lost, somewhere alongside
Manhattan, and since the barge supporting the ensemble is not a natural
item, "Floating Island" is best classed as constructed nature. [See
Smithson's drawing and realization of plan.]
11. Gardens
Since I have already made the segue to artworks, let me turn from the
topic of urban nature to that of gardens. Obviously, we are not in the
business of constructing essentialist definitions of any of the terms
discussed here. Gardens straddle the divide between art and nature. Most,
but not all, gardens contain natural materials; most, perhaps all, are
intentionally designed. (We should leave open the possibility of aleatory and
found gardens.) Some gardens are works of art. Following the theories of
Arthur Danto and of Noël Carroll and Jerrold Levinson, I would classify those
as gardens that make statements and require interpretation, or as gardens
knowingly inserted into the history of art (and the history of gardens) by
makers self-consciously extending and reacting to that history. Let us call
gardens without such aspirations vernacular gardens.
Given what was said above about essentialist definition, the borderline
between what I have called constructed nature and gardens, whether art
gardens or vernacular gardens, is a porous one. I would like to briefly
describe two interesting gardens that are works of art and that have special
relationships to nature. Then I shall conclude by discussing some bases for
aesthetically appreciating vernacular gardens.
The first garden I'd like to consider is Charles Jencks's Garden of Cosmic
Speculation in Portrack, Scotland. It is not open to the public but there is a
lavishly illustrated book that gives readers a virtual tour.[19] The first
account I read of this garden described it as about chaos theory. In fact, the
garden touches on many of our theories of nature. It is in a long tradition of
gardens that aspire to be microcosms of the universe. A distinctly modern
and scientifically literate exemplar of that tradition, it has, according to
Jencks, been designed "to celebrate what we know about underlying forces
and forms of nature" (p. 17). Shaped mounds called the snail rise and fall in
the pattern of a double helix, as does sculpture in the DNA garden. The
Garden of the Five Senses contains sculpted silver hands, nostrils, lips, and
so on, characterizing our sensory access to the world. A Black Hole Terrace
offers a nod to recent theories in physics. The many stunning gates
throughout the garden were inspired by soliton waves, which "can travel
through each other and keep their identity" (p. 77). The gates represent
waves of energy travelling through the metal elements as a series of twists.
The spare, modern shapes of the built mounds and shaped bodies of water
are stunning in and of themselves. They can be appreciated on purely
formal grounds. Yet they gain greater resonance when their scientific
content is explained. The forms and shapes Jencks has imposed on the land
here would not have occurred naturally, yet they are congruent with waves,
forces, and phenomena that cutting edge scientific theories take to
constituteour world. This garden, because of its beauty as well as its
content and its discursive ambitions, belongs in what Mara Miller has called
the tradition of grand gardens, gardens that properly claim to be works of
art.[20]
While Jencks's garden is about the natural world in a deep sense, another
recent urban garden stands in a different relation to nature. I have in mind
Robert Irwin's recently designed garden at the Getty Art Museum and
Institute in Los Angeles. The entire Institute sits high above Los Angeles on
a dramatic promontory. The hilltop campus of travertine and glass buildings
designed by Richard Meier recalls a medieval fortified city. The museum
itself echoes this complexity; it consists of a soaring entrance hall and five
linked pavilions. Visitors ascend to the Getty on trams. Thus the complex is
set apart from its urban and its natural surroundings in a number of
respects. Within this complex devoted to the acquisition, display, and study
of art is a central garden designed by an artist, Robert Irwin. His account of
its creation (also documented in a lavishly illustrated book[21]) makes clear
that he thought carefully about the choice of every design element, the
selection of every plant.
Unlike Jenck's Garden of Cosmic Speculation, Irwin's Getty Garden does
not, to my mind, have a set content viewers are meant to puzzle out. Yet in
many ways Irwin's garden is about nature and about nature's relation to
art. Its features prompt visitors to think about beauty and design,
abundance and artificiality. The area of the garden that most interests me is
the switchback path that visitors trace as they descend from the museum to
a terrace below anchored with a striking central emblem - a trilobed maze
formed from azaleas, all sitting in a circular pool. The descending path
crosses and re-crosses[22] a stream consisting of a bevelled channel laden
with carefully chosen rocks.
A rhythm develops; the rocks become larger and more numerous, the water
more visible and more forceful, as the descent continues. Irwin notes that
he wanted viewers to feel that no two stream-crossings were ever the
same: "[a]s the stream goes down, it changes in character and sound every
time it passes under a bridge...One of the things I wanted to do is that
every time you cross the stream, I wanted it to be different..." (p. 39).
I believe that Irwin's descending path functions much like parts of Byxbee
Park, discussed above. The path replicates, in carefully calculated ways, the
experience of walking along a stream in the natural world, having it
continually disappear from view, then reappear, as the stream meanders in
different directions. Here, then, in this citadel to art, an artist has
constructed a garden that offers up an experience that straddles my
categories of constructed and artificial nature. The plants and water are
natural, and subject to Budd's abstraction-based appreciation. The journey
along the path alludes to a journey through nature, yet that path delivers
visitors to a highly artificial garden complex whose central motif is
surrounded by rings of plants chosen - and replanted on schedule - to
ensure a steady array of colors and blooms. Another feature at the lower
level that further underscores the interplay between art and nature is a
series of sculpted metal 'cages' within which native bougainvillea trees grow
and bloom.
I have suggested that Jencks's garden is properly appreciated by noting not
only its severe beauty but also the theories it propounds, and that Irwin's is
properly taken in by savoring not only its variety of plant material but also
its distinctive design elements and its allusions to experiences of nature.
How ought we to treat gardens that don't have the vast ambitions of this
pair? That is, how ought we to comport ourselves with regard to the many
vernacular gardens we see and visit, gardens that don't aspire to be works
of art? I believe our discussion of nature and nature appreciation offers
some cues. Even when gardens don't aspire to deliver discursive content,
we can appreciate pleasing formal qualities, overall design, color and
texture, the beauties of particular plants. But in addition, we can recruit our
botanical and scientific knowledge to track two additional qualities - rarity
and difficulty.
These last become apparent when we employ the sort of counterfactual
thinking that played a role in our judgments of naturalness. Thus I am
suggesting that vernacular gardens can be appreciated not only on aesthetic
grounds, but also based on how far removed they are from nature! This
may sound paradoxical, as the great majority of such gardens are
assembled from natural materials. But if we ask ourselves, "what would
have been here otherwise?" we get a sense of how far away from the home
ecosystem the gardens' contents are. With regard to particular plants,
similar questions take hold. We can ask ourselves whether they're rare,
whether they're special hybrids, whether they've been coaxed or bred to be
double rather than single, triple rather than double, whether they're
ordinary denizens of this climate, whether they're ever found juxtaposed
with the blooms alongside them. Thus that old saw, that gardens straddle
the divide between nature and art, aids our appreciation of vernacular
gardens as well as gardens that aspire to be works of art. While we
appreciate the latter by noting their ties to the artworld, we can appreciate
the former, at least in part, by noting their distance from the world of
nature.
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